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Dialectic at a Moving Standstill: 
The Neurotic Misadventures of Philosophy of Mind
Dan Ganin
Introduction
Relatively recently, numerous philosophers of mind have espoused the epistemic 
intractability and impenetrability of both the mind-body problem and the problem of 
consciousness. While past and present attempts to theoretically resolve and circumvent these 
metaphysical questions have assumed many forms and postulated numerous conceptual 
paradigms (substance dualism, property dualism, eliminative materialism, functionalism, mind-
body identity theory, logical behaviorism, idealism, etc.), the fundamental problem of epistemic 
inexplicability has not substantially dissipated since the rationalist ruminations of Descartes and 
Leibniz. The nascent articulation of the epistemological insolvability of the mind-body problem 
that has so gravely and garishly confronted contemporary theorists of mind can, in fact, be found 
in the philosophical work of these two notable modernist thinkers. Thus, despite the curious 
anthropocentric tendency towards narrativizing human history as a teleological plot towards 
greater progress and enlightenment, in this paper I’d like to argue, by sketching out a 
historiography of the mind-body problem, however loose and inchoate, that the very 
philosophical problems, perplexities, and conundrums we still confront when addressing the link 
between consciousness and the physical workings of our neurophysiology haven’t really changed 
nor been radically reconceptualized since the epoch of Descartes and Leibniz.
The seemingly primordial problem of epistemic inexplicability has been acknowledged 
and ascertained all along, far before the noumenal naturalism of Colin McGinn or principled 
agnosticism of Thomas Nagel. Regardless of the proposed solution, underpinning all of these 
theories of mind, whether implicitly or explicitly, is an acknowledgement that an epistemic gap or 
dissimilarity exists between the physical and phenomenological domains and, thus, infer from this 
failure of epistemic reduction, inference, or deduction that either consciousness is epiphenomenal, 
ontologically nonphysical, or that we are cognitively closed from intelligibly grasping the 
psychophysical relation between mind and body -- between conscious thought and physical 
extension.
Moreover, even contemporary arguments leveled against reductionist materialist thought, 
though superficially distinct and terminologically different, strongly mirror those arguments 
presented by both Descartes and Leibniz – particularly Descartes – against a purely reductive 
mind-body identity thesis. The problem of consciousness, the difficulties in giving a coherent and 
consistent philosophical account of how objectivity can give rise to subjectivity, of how 
subjective conscious experience can be reduced to the terms of an objective physical account 
without leaving residual phenomena unaccounted for, of how an objective process can have a 
subjective nature, and what it would mean to give an objective account of subjectivity have been 
explored and ascertained, however implicitly, all along.
Dialectic at a Moving Standstill – An Overview of Epistemic Inexplicability and 
Epistemic Intuition:
The history of philosophy of mind essentially reads like a dialectic at a moving standstill, 
exhibiting a recurring neurotic-like pattern based upon the polemical tension between the intuitive 
notion that our robust subjective phenomenological experience is real and the desire to render 
these intelligible in the objective universalistic terms of a scientific physicalism. Though most of 
us have an epistemically primary notion that there exists a fundamental psychophysical link 
between mind and body, between our phenomenological experience and the workings of the brain, 
this connection seems inexplicable in and irreducible to purely physical terms and explanations. 
There seems, in other words, to exist an unsolvable, unbridgeable, irreducible epistemic or 
explanatory gap between the objective terms of physics and physiology and the subjective terms 
of conscious experience or qualia.
Both reductionist explanations of phenomenological consciousness and antireductionist 
accounts present flabbergasting perplexities. While the former generally seems to leave out 
subjective experience, qualia, and intentional semantic content – namely, what it is like to have a 
conscious experience – the latter seems somewhat antiscientific, eerie, and mystical in its 
epiphenomenal tendencies and marked inability to account for mind-body causal interaction 
without invoking supernatural forces or divine intervention. Either way, both philosophical 
tendencies and accounts seem to leave something we intuitively know and experience everyday 
out of the philosophical picture; namely, that there exists a psychophysical causal nexus between 
mind and body and that conscious experience and subjective qualia do actually exist.
Materialist theories of the mind first emerged, in part, as a philosophical attempt to 
circumvent and resolve the problems of mind-body interaction raised by Cartesian dualism. With 
its disjunctive split between an immaterial mind and a material body, Cartesian dualism, or 
substance dualism, presented the following problematic question, one addressed to Descartes 
himself by Princess Elizabeth1: How can an immaterial mind, free-floating and unanchored in the 
physical realm, be causally efficacious in a physical world governed by a closed system of 
physical causal laws? Rejecting Cartesian dualism as incoherent, inconsistent, and antiscientific 
in our current physical world picture, rejecting the reality of mysteriously and ineffably 
immaterial mind “stuff”, materialist theories of the mental thus hoped to resolve the problems of 
mind-body interaction and mental causation. However, whether they were reductionist or 
antireductionist in form, despite their ardent hopes and wishes, materialist theories of the mind 
were largely unable to philosophically grapple with issues of mental causation and 
phenomenological conscious experience.2 Thus, though reductionist theories of mind, attempting 
to dispense with the notion of the mental and consciousness as largely internal and ineffable, have 
principally had to deal with issues of subjectivity and subjective qualia, antireductionist theories, 
embracing a kind of property dualism rather than substance dualism, have had to grapple with the 
issue of how consciousness and mental events could exert a causal effect upon a physical body 
spatiotemporally situated in a physical world. As a result of either the counterintuitive absence of 
subjectivity or the relegation of mental properties to the status of epiphenomena (disregarding the 
assertion of supernatural phenomena and divine intervention), as John Searle compellingly argues, 
a curious neurotic-like pattern thus emerged in the history of philosophical materialism. Namely, 
a recurring urge to offer a credible account of mental phenomena that makes no reference to 
anything irreducibly or intrinsically mental.3
Searle however attributes this repetitive neurotic-like pattern to materialism being held 
implicitly captive to a certain conceptual dualism, to being continually informed by the 
conceptual categories and polarities of Cartesian metaphysics. Yet, as some of Searle’s peers 
have argued, the polar dichotomy between mental terms and physical terms may lie beyond our 
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cognitive capabilities to bridge. 4  Though Searle thinks that transcending or collapsing the 
conceptual dualism of Cartesian thought is epistemically possible, that the psychophysical link 
between the mental and the physical can be rendered intelligibly without simply positing an 
inexplicably irreducible primary notion, this appears unlikely.
Ironically, the very arguments enumerated by Searle that have historically been leveled 
against the reductionist attempts of materialist thought, can be leveled against Searle’s theory of 
biological naturalism or emergentism.5 For even if consciousness is ultimately physical, even if 
mental properties and events are causally emergent system features from our biological basis, the 
problem of giving a coherent and consistent explanation of the psychophysical link, without 
neglecting certain qualitative aspects of conscious experience, remains a deep and intractable 
problem. And these fundamental epistemological difficulties stem from the fact that the character 
of this epistemic gap, or dissimilarity, with regard to consciousness differs from that of the gaps 
in other domains of physical, natural, objective scientific inquiry. One cannot reduce, deduce, 
explain, or infer the perceptual phenomenological appearance and experience of redness, water, 
lighting, heat, pain, etc., from the brute physical truth of the material world. Principally, the idea 
of moving from appearance to reality makes no sense in the case of consciousness for its 
appearance is its reality.
As Thomas Nagel demonstrates, it is logically impossible to exclude the 
phenomenological aspects of conscious experience from a reduction in the same way that one 
excludes phenomenal features of material substances – by explaining them as effects on the mind 
of a conscious observer. With other phenomena in the material world, the distinction between 
appearance, between the phenomenological features it presents to a conscious spectator, and 
reality hold; yet, with consciousness the phenomenological experience is, at least in part, part of 
the phenomenon’s reality. With lighting, heat, water, or any other external, physical phenomenon 
the distinction holds and a necessary identity can be posited with its underlying physical structure 
and causal functioning. However, because the subjective element cannot be cleaved from the 
qualitative conscious experience of pain, itchiness, or seeing red, a reductive identity of the same 
sort cannot be established. A reduction of this sort, of heat to the physical movement of physical 
molecules, can only succeed if a specific subjective point-of-view is omitted from what it is to be 
reduced. But with the phenomenological aspects of consciousness, because every subjective 
phenomenon is essentially connected with a specific vantage point which a physicalist theory 
would inevitably omit or abandon in its quest to intelligibly explicate phenomena from a single 
objective point-of-view, transcending the phenomenological appearance of mental events would 
omit the very phenomenological reality of conscious experience.6
Historical Mirror (Part I) – Descartes Epistemic Primitive:
Because of the incomprehensibility of the exact character of the psychophysical 
connection between bodily events and phenomenal experience, neither perceivable by directing 
the senses towards the brain nor behavior that seemingly expresses conscious thought, it seems 
that any explanation “will always require explanatorily primitive principles to bridge the gap 
4
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from the physical to the phenomenal”.7 Interestingly, this contemporary assertion against the 
reductive attempts of materialism almost precisely echoes Descartes answer to the difficulty of 
mind-body interaction raised by Princess Elizabeth and others; namely, that the substantial union 
between mind and body is “one of those self-evident things which we only make obscure when 
we try to explain them in terms of others.”8
Descartes, like numerous contemporary philosophers of mind, seems to have arrived at 
the conclusion that the substantial union between mind and body, the intuitive idea that there 
actually exists a psychophysical link between mental events and physical events, cannot be 
clearly and distinctly conceived or explained through the pure understanding of scientific inquiry. 
Rather, the union constitutes a primary notion that is very clearly presented in daily experience. 
Though “all this is unintelligible,”9 though the causal connection between mind and body, the 
mental and the physical, conscious thought and material extension, cannot be adequately 
comprehended in terms of a pure physical theory, in terms of a causally closed physical universe, 
it nevertheless is taught to us by nature and inner experience. As Lilli Alanen asserts, 
Descartes’ notion of the human person as a union of mind and body may be incoherent 
and unsatisfactory – his insistence that human experience requires a specific, primary 
notion however expresses the important insight that the terms in which we describe and 
account for it in daily life are not reducible to terms used in the successful account of 
either physical nature or purely intelligible matters.10
Descartes, much like the noumenal naturalists, the principled agnostics, and other 
contemporary philosophers of mind seems to have viewed the mind-body union as both 
substantial and imbued with “some truth.”11 However, as an epistemically primitive, intuitive fact 
of lived experience it cannot be coherently explained by a reduction to other, physical terms and 
proofs. If everything physical has a purely physical explanation and understanding, then 
consciousness stands inexplicable in the terms of any scientific, physicalist theory. More 
importantly though, Descartes’ assertion of the epistemic inexplicability of the mind-body union 
in the terms of pure understanding does not seem to merely represent an ad hoc and 
unsatisfactory attempt to silence his objectors. Rather, his conclusion in the Meditations seems to 
reflect a deep and subtle understanding of the very epistemic gap between the physical and 
phenomenological realms; a gap which seems to logically entail some form of dualist conception 
of mind.
Historical Mirrors (Part II) – Main Arguments for Epistemic Inexplicability
David Chalmers has identified three main sorts of arguments against materialism’s 
attempt to reduce phenomenological features of conscious experience to a purely physical 
account; all of which establish an epistemic gap between physical properties and consciousness.12
First, there’s the knowledge argument. The knowledge argument asserts that one could 
know all the physical facts of neurophysiology, physics, etc., and still be unable to know or 
epistemologically deduce all the facts about consciousness on the basis of that very knowledge of 
physical properties and processes.  For example, as Nagel argues, one could know all about the 
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objective behavior of a bat and the functioning of its neurophysiology, both structurally and 
causally, yet still not know, either through the physicalist understanding or the imagination, what 
it is like to be a bat from its own subjective point-of-view. From this epistemic gap between the 
physical understanding of bat physiology and understanding the bat’s phenomenological point-of-
view, Nagel first concludes that physical explanation cannot fully capture, without residue, the 
qualitative aspects of subjectivity and, thus, is led to surmise that materialism is an unintelligible 
position because we don’t understand how the psychophysical relation between consciousness 
and the physical properties of the brain could be rendered coherently in naturalistic terms. 
Similarly, Frank Jackson argues that though someone (i.e. Mary) may know all about the physical 
facts underlying sensation and perception (i.e. the neurophysiological structures and processes 
that underpin the sensation of seeing red) without knowing all the facts about consciousness; 
namely, the qualitative experience of consciously experiencing red. Jackson, thus, concludes from 
this epistemic gap, from Mary’s failure to deduce the qualitative features of phenomenological 
consciousness from a complete physical understanding, that consciousness is irreducible and, thus, 
inexplicable in purely physicalist terms. Moreover, from this epistemic gap he inferentially 
concludes that facts about consciousness are in some sense nonphysical facts and, subsequently, 
that the mind is simply epiphenomenal.13
It is important to note, as these examples highlight, that the epistemic gap between facts 
of consciousness and physical facts does not necessarily entail candidly relegating mind as 
epiphenomenal; rather, one could just as easily claim agnosticism, posit an ontological gap 
between mind and body, inferring that mind is immaterial, or infer that consciousness is physical 
yet noumenal with regard to our cognitive and epistemological capabilities. Thus, Colin McGinn 
implements the knowledge argument to posit an irreducible epistemic gap, claiming that no 
concept needed to explain the workings of the physical world would suffice to explain the 
character of consciousness, and then arguing that though the brain naturalistically gives rise to 
consciousness, we are cognitively closed – terminally – from intelligibly grasping the 
psychophysical relation. Thus, though Descartes ultimately inferred the existence of a stark 
ontological gap between an immaterial mind and a material body, though he explicitly argued 
from what he took to be the essential natures of both entities to the contingency of their 
connection, and Leibniz, likewise, posited the notion of pre-established harmony from the failure 
to intelligibly explicate the attribute of thought in terms of a causally closed physical universe, 
their respective solutions to the mind-body problem underscore a perception of an irreducible 
epistemic gap between mind and body, thought and extension, features of consciousness and 
physical states of the body. However, since their epistemic and causal arguments cut across all 
three arguments delineated by Chalmers, further discussion will be temporarily postponed.
Secondly, there’s the explanatory argument against physicalism. The explanatory 
argument asserts that physical accounts only explain the world in terms of spatiotemporally 
situated structures and causally efficacious functional states and, thus, that from these facts one 
could only deduce further facts about structures and functions. However, explaining causally 
relevant functional states and physical structures doesn’t fully suffice to explain consciousness; in 
particular, these facts cannot adequately deal with the subjective character of mental events (i.e. 
the qualitative experiencing of seeing red, feeling pain, having a semantic understanding of 
Chinese rather than merely giving the functional appearance of understanding, etc.).
And thirdly, there is the modal argument against any form of reductive physicalism. It 
argues that the relation between conscious states and bodily physical states appears fundamentally 
contingent and, thus, since it is at least metaphysically possible that their could exist a world that 
is physically identical to this one yet lacks consciousness or the attribute of thought, then 
consciousness must be a further component of our universe. Essentially this argument exploits 
13
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modal notions of possibility and necessity to establish a conceivable disjunction between 
consciousness and physical processes and, thus, to affirm the metaphysical possibility of 
dissociation.
Kripke’s modal argument against materialism is possibly the most well known and best 
articulated in contemporary philosophy of mind. He argues that since any statement identifying a 
pain with a brain state would have to be necessarily true, it would exclude the possibility of being 
in pain and yet not being in this particular brain state. But this seems wrong since an organism 
with a different physiology might well be capable of feeling pain. Moreover, mental states could 
not be necessarily physical for to identify anything mental with anything nonmental would 
ultimately leave out the mental. In other words, since the subjective element and 
phenomenological quality of pain cannot be subtracted from the concept of pain, since the 
conscious perception of pain cannot simply be reduced to a particular brain state without 
eliminating the subjective meaning of pain, it cannot be considered a necessary identity. Thus, if 
mental states cannot be identical to physical states, then one can imagine the metaphysical 
possibility of mental states without physical states and vice versa, whether this occurs in possible 
zombies or Martians.
Historical Mirrors (Part III) – Descartes and Leibniz’s Arguments for Epistemic 
Inexplicabilities to Epistemic Intuitions
Descartes’ thought, which ironically shares the naturalistic assumption of all materialist 
theories of mind that the physical universe is governed by a closed system of causal laws, exhibits 
a particularly keen understanding of the irreducible epistemic gap from which he, like 
contemporary reductionists and antireductionists, has inferred counterintuitive, mysterious, and 
supernatural conclusions about the nature of the psychophysical link. Based upon his causal 
assumptions and principles, Descartes either argued from the epistemic gap or dissimilarity 
between conscious thought and physical extension to the inexplicability of an irreducible mind-
body union or to the counterintuitive thesis of the universal innateness of all ideas. Since the 
perceived epistemic gap and his subsequent attempts at resolution appear to hinge on his causal 
principle and its correlative assumptions, it seems important to first elucidate them.
Assuming the common notion that nothing can come from nothing and that what is more 
perfect (i.e., what contains in itself more reality) cannot come into being from what is less perfect, 
Descartes maintained that causes are necessarily similar to their effects in the sense that a cause 
must contain (formally or eminently) whatever is contained (formally or objectively) in its effect. 
To clarify, the Cartesian principle of causation holds that a cause contains a perfection formally if 
it actually exemplifies or embodies it while a cause contains a perfection eminently if the cause 
can somehow produce the objects that contain them formally or objectively (i.e. 
representationally).  Moreover, the Cartesian notion of eminent containment also requires that the 
cause must hold at least a similar level of reality or perfection to those exemplified by its 
effects.14  And it seems to be precisely this causal principle that eventually leads Descartes to 
assert that the interaction between thoughts and the mechanistic movements of physical bodies 
cannot be conceptually explicated in a clear and distinct manner and, later, to the supposedly 
rational conclusion “that sensory ideas are not transmitted to him from external things, in spite of 
our natural propensity to believe that they are.”15 Moreover, he seems to arrive at these very 
philosophical conclusions through invoking the three arguments (i.e. the knowledge argument, 
the explanatory argument, and the modal argument), generally together, mentioned above.
14
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In mediation two of his Meditations, while contemplating the epistemic relation between 
a physical fragment of wax and its intellectual understanding, Descartes notices that there is a 
certain explanatory gap between knowledge of the physical properties of the wax and knowledge 
of its essential nature of waxness. Partly from this observation, he thus concludes that while its’ 
essentially extended, corporeal nature can be manipulated and changed, no matter what physical 
color or shape the material body assumes its fundamental nature as wax remains in and can be 
grasped by the pure intellect of the mind. He states, “for whatever came under the senses of taste, 
smell, sight, touch, or hearing has now changed; and yet the wax remains.” 16   Descartes’ 
reasoning thus reflects a number of intuitions: (1) that the epistemic relation between physical 
properties and the intellectual understanding of them in conscious thought is felt to be somewhat 
contingent, (2) that knowledge of the truth about the wax cannot simply be deduced from its 
physical properties and the changes they undergo, and (3) that explaining the physical structure of 
the wax doesn’t appear to conceptually account for all the properties felt to be contained in the 
phenomenon (i.e. the waxness of the wax – the subjective experience of the wax). Of course, if 
we disregard panpsychism, and claim that there is nothing that it is like to be the wax, that the 
physical fragment of wax has no conscious experience, then, though Descartes’ own 
phenomenological experience of the wax cannot be smoothly reduced to the physical workings of 
his brain, we can render the wax itself in the objective, universal terms of physicalism as a certain 
configuration of physical and chemical properties and causally efficacious functional relations. 
However, as explained earlier, this reduction cannot be coherently enacted in the case of 
consciousness itself. And in meditation six Descartes seems to stumble upon this very fact in his 
two proofs for dualism, both of which involve a reflection on the epistemic differences between 
the mental and the physical and, consequently, lead to the ontological inference that mind and 
body represent two fundamentally distinct entities.
The possibility proof of mind-body dualism, much like Kripke’s modal argument against 
mind-brain identity statements, principally notices a deep explanatory gap between the mental 
and the physical. Beginning with the notion that mind and body could be separated in thought, 
since one can clearly and distinctly understand one without the other, Descartes, based on a 
perceived epistemic contingency between mind and body, infers the metaphysical possibility that 
at least God could completely separate mind and body. Thus, he ultimately concludes that 
disembodiment is, at least, metaphysically possible.
Despite the fact that Descartes seems to momentarily indicate that mind could possibly 
exist in a disembodied state, his argument mirrors that of Kripke’s, though with an inverted 
conclusion. For Kripke’s modal argument, and similar zombie thought-experiments, also 
highlight the fact that the relation between conscious states and physical bodily states seem 
fundamentally contingent and, thus, it seems at least metaphysically possible, that a physically 
identical body to our own could exist yet lack consciousness. Hence, the psychophysical 
connection is not explicable in a reductive, necessarily true identity statement. Analysis of 
consciousness in terms of physical nature, or in terms of the attribute of extension for Descartes, 
for all the modal arguments seems to underscore the thought that the subjective character of 
conscious experience cannot be captured by a reductive analysis of the mental, since this seems 
logically compatible with its absence. Or rather, analysis of the mind in terms of physical features 
could logically be ascribed to robotic automata that behaviorally exhibit consciousness (or as-if 
intentionality), though actually lacking any intrinsic consciousness or intentional content. 
Conversely, a similar materialist analysis could logically ascribed mind to non-conscious aliens 
who, though physically identical to human beings, lack similar conscious experiences.
Nevertheless, it still seems absurd to try to dissociate the two entirely, to let mind float 
completely free of the body. Thus, despite the felt contingency between mental states and 
physical states, between the attributes of conscious thought and extended matter; despite the fact 
16
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that the link between mind and body seems inexplicable, without invoking the benevolent honesty 
of God, Descartes explicitly rejects that mind is accidentally united to the body. For though he 
cannot intelligibly explicate the psychophysical causal link in terms of pure, mathematical-like 
understanding, he nevertheless concedes that the link is an epistemically primitive notion 
engendered by everyday experience and inner sensation. Thus, he writes, “there is nothing that 
my own nature teaches me more vividly than that I have a body, and that when I feel pain there is 
something wrong in my body…”17 Similarly, Descartes divisibility proof of mind-body dualism, 
though it again posits an irreducible epistemic gap between mind and body, he nevertheless 
maintains that the mind-body union represents an irreducible primary notion. The Cartesian mind 
isn’t merely like a sailor disembodied and completely separate from the corporeal being of her 
body-ship.
Otherwise, the Cartesian divisibility proof is not just another modal argument against 
reductionism. Rather, like the explanatory arguments previously outlined, it exemplifies the 
notion that because physical accounts fundamentally account for extended matter situated 
spatiotemporally, they cannot therefore explain aspects of conscious experience, for their 
perceptual reality is not spatially situated. If it is generally granted that our perceptual senses, 
whether in the act of perception or introspection, are geared toward representing a spatial world, 
to presenting objects in space with spatially defined properties like finiteness and divisibility, then 
Descartes’ characterization of the mind as unified and indivisible seems tantamount to asserting 
its non-spatiality. Obviously, he already posited the non-spatial nature, or appearance, of the mind 
when he characterized it as an ontologically immaterial, non-extended entity. Thus, his argument 
that bodies are by nature divisible substances while minds are naturally indivisible seems to 
emerge from the non-spatial character of introspective phenomenological experience. Put 
differently, his argument underscores a certain epistemic distinction between the non-spatial, 
nonphysical, and thus seemingly indivisible nature of mind and the spatially situated, physical, 
and thus divisibility of bodies.
Hence, according to the logical rule of non-contradiction that a single entity cannot 
synchronically exist with two separate properties (i.e. as both indivisible and divisible), Descartes 
infers from the epistemic distinction and dissimilarity between introspective sensibility and 
external perception that the mind and body are wholly diverse. That is, since mind and body can 
only be clearly and distinctly conceived, conceptually, in separation from one another, since it 
would be logically absurd and impossible to conceive them as a unified identity containing two 
diametrically opposed terms, Descartes infers that they are wholly diverse ontologically. Again, 
the Cartesian argument seems to betray the epistemological notion that, because of the existence 
of an irreducible and inexplicable epistemic gap between mind and body, establishing an identity 
between the mental and the physical not only seems logically absurd, but the very reduction 
leaves something out – namely, the phenomenological experience of consciousness as a 
nonphysical, non-spatially situated, indivisible phenomenon. Like contemporary thinkers, 
Descartes’ theoretical ruminations thus allude to the fact that sense qualities cannot be, at the least 
conceptually or epistemically, reductively translated into the quantitative terms of physical 
explanation. Yet sadly, the dialectical desire, or neurotic compulsion, of Descartes’ materialist 
leanings to account for both the reality and the causal efficacy of the mental, to find a place for 
mind in a causally-closed physical universe, seems to have later led him to counterintuitively 
reasoning that all of our sensory ideas are innate.
As Geoffrey Gorham convincingly argues, as a result of his causal assumptions, 
Descartes argued for the universal innateness of all ideas based upon the marked epistemic 
dissimilarity he ascertained between the intentional/representational contents of those ideas and 
17 Ibid., p.17.
“their putative external causes.”18 Since the ontological hierarchy of Cartesian metaphysics places 
infinite entities like mind on a higher plane of perfection or reality than finite substances, 
Descartes assumed that their exists nothing in our ideas that is contained formally and eminently 
in bodies. Thus, according to his causal principle, he concludes that bodies and bodily sensations 
cannot logically exert a causal effect upon the production of our ideas. Rather, bodies and bodily 
sensations merely provide a coincidental occasion for an already innate idea to come to the 
forefront of consciousness, without possessing any real or direct causal impact upon the innate 
and formerly dormant mental event. Moreover, in order to account for the law-like correlation 
between corporeal motions and mental ideas in the absence of an ontically real causal relation, 
Descartes’ asserts that this simply arises from the fact that God has established a law-like 
succession, or constant conjunction, between two causally unrelated events. Thus, according to 
the universal innateness thesis, when Descartes stubs his toe, the physical event does not causally 
impact the mental impression of pain; rather, it merely provides an occasion for the already innate 
idea of pain to assert itself in consciousness. And further, the constant conjunction of the two 
events is merely a reflection of the law-like succession established by God to ensure his bodily 
preservation. As Descartes’ writes, “The ideas of pain, colors, sounds and the like must all be 
innate, if on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing 
them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.”19 Again,
as the remark highlights, this movement of reasoning from epistemic dissimilarity to the non-
causality of body-on-mind seems to underscore a felt explanatory gap and contingency between 
the mental and the physical.
Descartes’ assertion that no idea could have its causal origin in observation, nor that the 
“faculty of thought must rely on the sense organs,”20 reveals a felt contingency between mental 
events, states, and intentional content and the physical sense organs of the body. Like Kripke’s 
logical argument against mind-brain identity theses, it reveals the irreducible epistemic gap 
between any idea X and any neurophysiological event Y. Thus, as a result of this apparent 
contingency, as a result of the epistemic dissimilarity that exists between an account of a brain 
state and a mental idea composed of irreducible intentional/representational content, their 
psychophysical causal connection seems somewhat arbitrary and the physical state itself cannot 
seem to account for the idea. Put more generally, because the mere perception of the physical 
body cannot reveal certain irreducible qualia (i.e. the intentional content of ideas), according to 
his causal principle, Descartes must either posit an epistemic primitive, that something can come 
from nothing, or that physical bodies and bodily sensations do not cause our ideas. While the first 
appears to be a kind of theoretical cop-out, the second physically impossible, and the third 
counterintuitive, Descartes chose the third option. Yet, in a curious metaphysical maneuver, one 
mirroring the parallelism of Leibnizian philosophy, he still gives into the aforementioned intuitive 
feeling that there actually exists a fundamental, law-like psychophysical relation between bodily 
states and mental states; one wholly inexplicable in physical or causal terms. In this respect, one 
can see a certain affinity between Descartes’ thesis of the universal innateness of all ideas and 
Leibniz’s conception of a pre-established harmony between the attributes of thought and 
extension.
The Leibnizian notion of a pre-established harmony theoretically establishes that “bodies 
act as if there were no souls (though this is impossible); and souls act as if there were no bodies; 
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and both act as if each influenced each other.”21 Much like the Cartesian thesis of universal 
innateness, arguably for similar causal and epistemic reasons and difficulties, it claims that there 
is a certain degree of illusion to mind-body causation. I say a certain degree for Descartes’ theory 
only claims that body-on-mind causation is an illusion, where as Leibniz gives up on the notion 
all together. Yet, it seems that Leibniz's own intuitive feeling and desire to salvage the irreducible 
and otherwise inexplicable facts of everyday experience, may have also led him to a fantastic 
conception of his own; namely, the lucky parallelism of his pre-established harmony thesis. 
Moreover, this particular supernatural solution to the problem of mind-body interaction also 
seems to result from his own epistemic difficulty in intelligibly explicating consciousness in 
purely physical terms. As Leibniz explicitly and emphatically remarks regarding consciousness, 
“the perception, and what depends on it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons, that is, 
through shapes or motions.”22 Subsequently providing a near-emblematic thought-experiment, 
Leibniz offers a, though simple, argument which highlights the inexplicable epistemic gap that 
lies between physical knowledge and our everyday experience of being conscious. Like numerous 
contemporary thought-experiments, from Ned Block’s China Body to Nagel’s bats, Leibniz’s 
enlarged mill experiment revolves around the gap between objectively perceiving the brain, 
between perceiving physical structures and functions, and understanding how its’ physical 
properties and processes could give rise to and account for conscious experiences like 
phenomenological perception. Leibniz remarks that if upon internal inspection one only found 
physical properties and processes, “parts that push one another,” one would “never find anything 
to explain perception” 23  that is, the irreducible phenomenological character of conscious 
experience.
Conclusion – A Return to Epistemic Gaps and Epistemic Intuitions
 As the present paper has attempted to show, it seems as if both Descartes and Leibniz, 
like a multitude of contemporary philosophers, appeared to apprehend the epistemic gap that 
continues to lie like a traumatic kernel at the heart of philosophy of mind. Moreover, it also 
appears that the two philosophers’ particular attempts to resolve the epistemic and causal 
difficulties raised by the mind-body problem and the problem of consciousness, again like many 
contemporary theorists, ultimately resulted in seemingly fantastic, mysterious, even somewhat 
comic metaphysical claims. Philosophically, it seems that the psychophysical link between mind 
and body may only be explicable in the irreducible facts of lived experience; that it cannot be 
explained by any reduction to simpler proofs beside God or as the mysterious orphan by-product 
of evolutionary development. So the dialectic at a moving standstill runs itself static, and the 
neurotic misadventures of philosophy of mind go on. However, as McGinn writes: “a happy side 
benefit is that I feel no temptation to deny the existence of things that are terminally puzzling. I 
can now, for example, see my way clear to believing in free will again after twenty-five years of 
denying its’ very possibility – on the ground that neither the random nor the determined could 
accommodate.” 24 The other, non-neurotic, non-static side of the dialectic's coin – the 
transcendence to freedom and free will.
This is not, however, to argue that neuroscientific inquiry into the psychophysical should 
cease all together. Though we may be cognitively closed from ever fully and intelligibly 
explicating the link between consciousness and the physical brain in rigorous philosophical terms, 
though the epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenological domains may be 
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irreducible, we can still postulate constructive theories about how the brain and consciousness 
interact and how different features of consciousness supervene upon certain physical properties 
and processes in the brain. We can still postulate detailed links and correlations between the mind 
and the body that are both illuminating and enriching without perfectly capturing 
phenomenological experience in purely physical terms. Ultimately, though the objective, 
universalistic point-of-view of the physical sciences may terminally fail to capture the subjective 
experiences of consciousness, this does not necessarily undermine the physicalist endeavor to 
detail the specific physical properties that causally subserve conscious phenomenological 
experience.
